'This paper presents a novel cryptographic scheme which fully conforms to the requirements of holding large scale general elections. The participants of the scheme are the voters, the candidates and thc government. Thc schcmc ensures independence between the voters in that they do not have to be present at the same time or go through several phases together; no global computation is needed. The scheme preserves the privacy of the votes against any subset of dishonest voters, and against any proper subset of dishonest candidates, including the government. Robustness is ensured in that no subset of voters can corrupt or disrupt the election. This also means that no voter is able to vote more than once without being detected. The verifiability of the scheme ensures that the government and the candidates cannot present a false tally without being caught. "Voting by telephone" is possible by employing the proposed scheme.
Introduction
This paper presents a cryptographic scheme for secret ballot elections. It is a scheme which fully conforms t o the requirements of holding large scale general elections. T h e scheme involves the eligible voters, thc government, and the candidates the voters can vote on. The basic assumptions of the scheme are that each voter can communicate all Ihe carididates (from UUW on, this includes the government) simultaneously, and that a t least one candidate d o not collaborate with the others. Under these assumptions, the scheme is robust in that no subset of dishonest voters and no proper subset of dishonest candidates can disrupt or corrupt the election, and the privacy of the votes and voters is preserved.
The verifiability of the scheme is restricted to the candidates. (It is possible to include other, possibly more trustworthy parties.) Assuming that every voter trusts one of these parties, this yields public verifiability. The verifiability ensures, with overwhelming probability, that the government cannot present a false tally without being caught.
The scheme is well suited for implementing a "voting by telephone" scheme. 
Relation to Previous Work
There have been several publications on the problem of holding elections by employing computers and cryptographic protocols, and several cryptographic schemes have been proposed where the voters openly send encrypted messages back and forth until they all are confident of the outcome of the election (boardroom voting) [DLM82, Yao82, Mer831. The problems with these schemes are that one has to know in advance who wish to vote. and if any voter stops following the protocol during the election, the election cannot be completed. Such schemes are clearly not suitable for real-world elections.
Chaum has given an election scheme that makes use of one or several trusted ''mixes" to scramble pairs of votes and digital pseudonyms [Cha81] . Whereas Chaum's scheme hides the identity of the voters, the scheme of (Cohen) Benaloh e t al. hides the actual value of the vote [CF85, BY86, Ben871. They take a quite different approach. by employing the hardness of deciding higher residues and interactive protocols.
My work has been much inspired by that of Benaloh et al., and it has adopted many of their ideas. The scheme of this paper does to some extent conform to their election paradigm. The major problem that their scheme succumbs t o is that it requires the participants to go through several phases together, where one phase cannot start before all the participants have finished the previous. This problem is solved in my scheme; all voters register and vote totally independent.
The scheme presented is a very practical and flexible election scheme. It can be used to implement almost any election setting; from the conventional setting where each voter show up (independently!) at the voting place, register, vote, and goes back home; to some kind of "voting by telephone" setting.
Chaum has given another method of holding verifiable secret ballot elections that removes the need for a mix [Cha88] . The work is similar to that of a boardroom election in that a failure of a single voter can disrupt the election. However, Chaum's method ensures that such failures can be traced. This allows an election to be restarted without the faulty voter. but this approach is not practical for large-scale elections.
Boyd has proposed a voting scheme based on the use of "multiple key ciphers" [Boy88, BOYSO] . It ensures that votes cannot be forged, and privacy is preserved, provided the voters can deliver their votes anonymously. The major problem of this scheme is that the government can see the votes delivered and even worse, produce a false tally by adding votes of its own choice; there is no verifiability.
I here present the privacy homomorphism that is used to construct the ballots of the election scheme. The privacy homomorphism is additive and probabilistic, i.e., the cleartext domain operation is (modular) addition and there are several different and uncorrelated encryptions of the same number. For full details, see Ref.
[lve9la].
Election Triples
Definition 2.1 Let k be a security parameter, e be a fixed small prime, p be a k/Zbit prime such that el(p -l), and q be a k/2-bit prime such that e J ( q -1). Further, let n = p q . Finally, let g be an element in 2 ; such that e divides the order of g. For such e , g, and n, 1 define an election triple to be (e, g ) n).
I will throughout let G be the set of powers of g modulo n ; G = { g j (mod n)lj 2 1).
Index Classes
Definition 2.2 Let ( e , g, n) be an election triple. Let w z g* (mod n) E G, for some Definition 2.3 An election triple ( e , g, n ) is said to be valid when e divides the order of g. The election triple is said to be good if g in addition is a generator modulo p .
In Ref. [IveSlb] it is devised an efficient perfect zero-knowledge protocol that enables the publisher of an election triple to convince anyone who wants to be assured that the triple is valid, without giving away any information about the secrets involved.
I am now ready to describe how to use the privacy homomorphism, Given a good election triple ( e , g , n ) , the values to be encrypted must be in the st-i Z,.
How to Encrypt
Suppose a party A wants to encrypt a number u E Z,. Then, A chooses r E R Z,, and computes x = v + re,
In general, llog2 e] bits of cleartext is expanded into k bits of ciphertext. Since there are several different encryptions of the same value, test for equality is not possible.
The Election Privacy Homomorphism Assumption
In this section, I formally state the intractability assumption for the problem of deciding index classes in the election privacy homomorphism. Clearly, the problem cannot be 
EPH Based Votes
I will now describe what the ballots and votes used in the election scheme will look like.
Before the election starts, I assume that every candidate has published a (preferably good, but possibly valid) election triple. Let ( e , gi, n,) be the election triple of candidate i, 1 5 i 5 r. e must be larger than the number of eligible voters.
I
Definition 3.1 Let ( e , g,, n;) be the election triple of candidate i, 1 5 i 5 U . A vote w is a a-tuple w = (g;' (mod n l ) , . . . , gEm (mod n u ) ) . . . , w,, are valid and xi"=, U j = cy=, flwjn = 1 (mod e ) .
I will refer to the v, = Cflwj]D as the actual vote for candidate j .
NOW, instead of the candidates having to store each ballot from all the voters, the hcmomorphism property comes into use. Let Wl and IV2 be two valid ballots. It should not be hard to see that to store the sum of the actual votes one can store the componentwise product of the votes in W1 and W,. = ( G I , . . . , G,,) . Then the final number of yes-votes for candidate j is @,).
I 4 Unreusable Eligibility Tokens
The basic assumptions of the election scheme will be applied here also; the voter communicates with all the candidates simultaneously, and at least one candidate is honest. Let the number of candidates be u.
The scheme for providing unreusable eligibility tokens is a modification to the scheme for providing unreusable electronic cash presented in Ref.
[CFNSO].
Initialization
The computations and actions described below can be done at any time before the process of token issuing starts, but only in the order indicated by the numbering.
1. The candidates agree on and publish two (even) security parameters k and S, a public one-way collision-free hash function h , and a Secure public digital signature scheme ([GMRSS]) to be used by the voters. Each candidate j then publishes its public RSA key ( e j , n j ) (the corresponding secret key is dj), such that (nj I = S.
2. For i = 1,. . . , k, the voter chooses integers a i , b;, t ; , r;, and 2; E R ZA, where n = maxj=l,...,,(nj), and computes the inverse of ri modulo each of the candidates' RSA modulus. The voter then prepares a digital signature on h(z1)llh(z2)11.. .I\h(zr).
Let Sv denote this signature.
Token Issuing
Some time before the election day, the voter presents and identifies him-or herself to the candidates (in an election office handling eligibility), and gives his or her public signature key to the candidates. The candidates create a string I D v which contains the voter's name, ID number, or any other information that the candidates want to establish. The voter and the candidates then perform the protocol below. During the initialization protocol, the candidates have verified that each of the k/2 Vi's they examined generates an appropriate IDVI[z,. I will now assume that the candidates have legal proof that the voter has voted more than once if they can present the preimage of at least ( k / 2 ) + 1 of the hash values h ( q ) in SV.
Using the Token
On the election day, when the voter is using the token in the voting process, the protocol below is performed by the voter and the candidates.
1. The voter sends ET to the candidates.
2. The candidates perform a sub-protocol to obtain the challenge string c, and send it to the voter. c = {ci E R {0,1}};=1,, , k / 2 .
3. For i = 1 , . . . , k/2, the voter sends the values yi to the candidates. If any of the checks fails, the candidates halt and reject, otherwise they halt and accept.
When the protocol is finished with the candidates accepting, the candidates check whether the token has been used before, by searching in a database where all the previously received tokens are stored. If it is not used before, the candidates store ET, the challenge string {c; ER ( 0 , l } } i = l , , , , , k / 2 , and the values ai, if ci = 0 , and ai @ ( I~v l ( z ; ) , if ci = 1. If the candidates discover that the token has been used before, then with overwhelming probability, any candidate is able to extract the identity I D v of the voter, and provide a legal proof of the fact that the voter has voted twice.
ET Security
The security of the unreusable electronic cash scheme was left as an open challenge in Ref.
[CFNSO], and no attempts to solve the problem have been made here. Ref. [IveSlb] gives a proof of unreusability.
The Election Scheme
The participants of the scheme are the eligible voters and the candidates. Let the number of eligible voters and candidates be p and u, respectiveIy, such that u < p. Note that the registration and voting phases can be performed independently by each voter.
Election Initialization
The candidates do what is described in Step 1 in Section 4.1. They then execute the following election initialization protocol
Agreeing on e: The candidates agree on a prime e which is larger than the number of eligible voters (e > p > I.).
Generating election triples:
For i = 1 to u , candidate i secretly produces two random s/2-bit primespi and qi, such that el(pj-1) and eJ(qi-1). Let ni = p i p i . Candidate i also chooses an element gi E Z:, which is a generator modulo p . pi and pi are kept secret, while ( e , g i , ni) is published as candidate i's election triple. Each candidate in turn must then give a zero-knowledge proof to show that the election triple is valid to any candidate who wants to be assured.
In the sequel of this chapter, all computations are done modulo the 71;' s. Which applies where should be clear from the subscript of the g; involved.
A Finally the candidates compute an initial "net ballot" Wo = GO,^,. . . , such that for all j , C @&,jD = 0. Each of the candidates then signs a copy of the hash value h(Foll0) using the secure digital signature scheme, and then publishes it. h is employed for efficiency reasons only. The zero that is concatenated with the ballot is the (initial) sequence number. This signing is to avoid that, when the-election is finished, any proper subset of dishonest candidates can construct their own find ballot and claim it to be the real one.
Voter Registration
An eligible voter first performs the eligibility token initialization described in Step 2 in Section 4.1. After this, she appears and identifies herself at a registration office to obtain an unreusable eligibility token, ET, produced by the protocol given in Section 4.2 with security parameter 2k.
Voter Initialization
At some time before the actual voting is to take place, the voter decides which candidate she wants to give a vote to. A vote on candidate 1 (the government) might yield a blank vote. I will for simplicity m u m e that the voter votes blank.
The voter then performs the initializing computations shown below. Note that these computations can be done off-line.
1. The voter prepares the ballot W according to the following program: 
2.
The candidates perform a sub-protocol to obtain a random challenge bit c ; , and send it to the voter.
3.
The voter answers with d;. 6. The candidates check that C:=l vi = 1 and that, for each i , g"' = n;=, W j [ d .
Besides the voting protocol the voter and the candidates perform the token usage protocol described in Section 4.3. This can easily be embedded in the voting protocol.
If none of the candidates have discovered any fallacies in the voting protocol or the token usage protocol, they accept the ballot, and indicates this to the voter by sending him or her signed "receipts" (of some sort). The candidates then compute the net ballot W, = (i&,,-l,~ * to,,^,. . ., ~~-1 ,~ -
where Wm,j is vote j of voter m. Again, each candidate signs a copy of h(?,llrn), as described in the election initialization protocol. where p' is the number of voters that actually voted during the election. Now, the total number of yes-votes cast for candidate j is CaG,,,,jD. To be able to compute this tally, the candidates have to publish their "sub-tallies", i.e., candidate i publishes the tuple 
Security
The first thing to notice is that the voting protocol is u versions of a computational zero-knowledge protocol, given in Ref. [Ive9lb] . Note also that the protocol for each vote in the ballot is run sequentially, so the protocol is still zero-knowledge.
Theorem 6.1 (Completeness) The ballot of an honest voter is accepted by honest candidates with probability one.
Proof:
The fact that each valid vote is accepted with probability one follows directly from the completeness part of the proof of zereknowledgeness of the voting protocol (see Ref. [IveSlb] ). In addition, for the whole valid ballot, the check performed by the candidates in Step 6 in the voting protocol will always be accepted. Proof: That this holds for each of the votes in the ballot follows directly from the soundness part of the proof of zero-knowledgeness of the voting protocol (see Ref. [IveSlb] ).
In addition, the fact that u < e implies that if more than one of the votes are yes-votes, then C:='=, vi > 1, and the honest candidates will not accept. 
The voting protocol is proven to be computational zero-knowledge (see Ref. [IveSlb] ), and this implies that no information about the value of the votes can be extracted only from executing the protocol. Let r denote any subset of dishonest candidates such that Irl < u. Let, for simplicity, the candidates in r be C1, C2,. . . , Co-l, and thus Irl = u -1. First, the candidates in r cannot extract any information from the index class of the elements they are able t o decrypt, i.e., from [~[ i ] ] , i < u in any votes. The other element w[u], will to the candidates in r, be a random element in Go.'
From the above it follows that a polynomial advantage in determining the actual vote for some candidate in some ballot (delivered by an honest candidate) yields a polynomial advantage in determining the actual vote for any candidate in any ballot.
Assume now that the candidates in I? have gained such a polynomial advantage (somehow). But, then this is a polynomial advantage in determining the index class of at least one element w[a], in any vote in any ballot. This clearly contradicts the EPHA, and our assumption must be wrong.
1
Theorem 6.4 (Unreusability) With overwhelming probability, no voter is able to vote more than once without being detected b y an honest candidaie.
'Recall that GI = {d (mod n,)lj 2 I}, where ( e , g I , n , ) is theelectiontriplepublishedby candidate
1.
Proof: This follows from the proof of unreusability of the eligibility tokens. See Ref. [IveSlb] . I Theorem 6.5 (Tally correctness) Under the assumptions that the employed signature scheme ts secure and that at least one candidaie zs honest, then, wzih overwhelming probability, the published tally i s equal fo the actual result of the electton.
Proof: TO be able to claim the validity of a published tally, the (claimed) final ballot must be shown together with signed copies from all the candidates. If this is the case, the properties of the privacy homomorphism ensures t h a t at most one tally can be produced from this final ballot (see Ref. [Ivegla] ). By the proof of soundness, every ballot ''in" the published net ballot is valid with overwhelming probability, and thus exactly one tally can be produced from it.
No proper subset of dishonest candidates can produce a valid final ballot with an equal or larger sequence number without breaking the signature scheme. 
1
The above election scheme enables voters to deliver their votes independent of each other. N o subset of voters can disrupt the election, and the same applies to any subset of less than u candidates.
Discussion
The scheme is very efficient in that nearly all timeconsuming computations can be done offline. In the most time-critical protocol -the voting protocol, the voter need not do any time-consuming computations.
The election scheme presented here has one important drawback; the possibility for a voter to be paid to vote for a dishonest candidate, and afterwards be able to prove to
